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Abstract
This work explores the effects of production offshoring on the workforce skill composition of
manufacturing firms. Its aim is to assess if the firms’ strategy to offshore production determines a
domestic employment bias in favor of high-skilled workers. Using three repeated cross-sections of
firm-level data over the period 1995-2003, we test the effect of production offshoring on the skill
composition by looking at different measures of skills by occupational title and by employing a
quasi-experimental analysis based on propensity score matching. Our results point to a modest,
and  in  some  cases  down-skilling,  impact  of  offshoring  on  the  skill  composition  of  Italian
manufacturing: in particular, we find that firms that farmed out production activities in 1998-2000
generally employ a lower share of skilled, non manual, workers with respect to the counterfactual
of non-delocalizing firms. Despite the usual findings about the negative impact of international
delocalization on low-skilled employment, we find that middle-managers are the most affected
category. Such evidence may find a twofold explanation: on the one hand, skilled workers can
decline more than unskilled workers because of a substitution effect that is driven by the will of
reducing  not  only  redundant  activities,  but  also  to  outsource  complementary  skill-intensive
activities such as control and coordination for which middle-managers are employed for. On the
other hand, skilled workers may decline in absolute terms, because of a quantity effect that occurs
when firms decide to transfer managerial staff in order to coordinate and supervise the activities
shifted abroad.
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1. Introduction
During the last three decades the way goods are manufactured has dramatically
changed. Next to an extensive use of IT capital, imported materials, intermediate
services and skilled labor, an increasing replacement of low-skill employment is
occurring due to the fact that firms de-locate low-skill intensive activities towards
less  developed,  cheap  labor,  countries.  Trade  flows,  import  competition  and
foreign direct investments (FDI),  thus,  result  in a reorganization of production
through  which  home  firms  can  specialize  on  the  high-value-added  phases  of
production while economizing on production costs. 
The  international  relocation  of  production  and  service  activities  has
received a lot of attention in recent times, and often in relation of the increasing
fear of domestic job losses, particularly concerning blue collars and low-skilled
personnel.  Traditionally, two main explanations have been given to account for
the shift in demand away from low-skilled workers in industrialized countries.  
The first refers to non-neutral technological change that, by fostering the
demand for more qualified workers within technologically advanced industries,
tends either to increase the wage inequality in relatively flexible labor markets
(like in the US and UK) or to increase the relative unemployment of less qualified
workers in relatively more rigid ones (as in Germany, France, Denmark and Italy)3
The  second  claims  for  increased  international  trade  and  globalization,
according to which labor is relocated in a way that determines a shift of activities
involving unskilled workers toward less-developed countries, while keeping high
skill-intensive activities at home, thus increasing the domestic firms' comparative
advantage in the production of high-value added goods. 
However, recent international evidence (Mann, 2003; Brainard and Litan,
2004; Amiti and Wei, 2005) has also shown that the increasing digitization and
globalization of production are enabling firms not only to offshore to low wage
countries pure manufacturing stages, but also services like software programming,
medical  diagnosis,  lab  research,  product  development  and  analytical  activities,
3 For  a  review  of  theoretical  and  empirical  models  of  skill-biased  technological  change  see
Chennels and Van Reenen (2002), Piva (2004) and Antonietti (2007). 
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thus creating the conditions for the transfer of IT, knowledge-intensive, jobs and
workers.  
Therefore,  it  is  worth  to  distinguish  between  two  strategies  of
international  delocalization  of  production:  one  characterized  by  a  vertical, or
defensive, nature and one by a horizontal,  or  asset seeking,  nature.  While the
former is designed to save on production costs through the relocation of low value
activities towards cheap-labor countries, the latter is, instead, driven by the will to
search  for  new  market  opportunities  or  specific  competencies  not  directly
available at  home.  The employment  effects  deriving from these two strategies
may be different: while, on the one hand, there is wide consensus on the skill
upgrading effect of vertical delocalization, less evident are the consequences on
the demand for skilled labor in the home country: if it is true that a higher demand
may arise because of the need for control, coordination and supervisory skills, it is
also  true  that  a  higher  outflow  of  skilled  personnel  may  occur  if  these
competences are required directly at the host country or if the firm off-shores IT
and knowledge-intensive activities previously developed at home. 
On  this  purpose,  Italy  represents  an  interesting  laboratory  because  the
employment effects of production offshoring do not only affect the single firm,
but also the economic context in which the firm is localized. In fact, the spatial
division of production activities  may generate not only a flow of technological
knowledge, competencies and information outside local production systems, such
as industrial districts or clusters of firms,  but also an increase of uncertainty and a
decrease  in  their  attractiveness,  thus  leading  to  a  possible  future  shortage  of
specialized personnel  (Corò,  Tattara and Volpe,  2006;  Prota and Viesti,  2006;
Spaventa and Monni, 2007).
Our contribution to the debate moves in two directions. First, differently
from the main literature that is typically interested at analysing the strategies of
multinational  firms,  we  focus  on  a  sample  composed  primarily  by  small  and
medium firms  located  in  Italy.  Second,  we  test  the  human  capital  impacts  of
production  offshoring  by  setting  up  a  quasi-experimental  exercise  based  on
propensity score matching, thanks to which we can compare the skill composition
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of offshoring firms to a suitable counterfactual sample of non-offshoring firms,
thus controlling for sample selection without relying on specific functional forms
of the objective functions. 
The article is structured as follow. Section 2 briefly sketches the empirical
literature developed around skill-biased effects of production offshoring. Section
3 describes data and the empirical methodology adopted. Section 4 presents and
discusses the main results achieved and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Background literature
Even if it has often been considered a ‘hot topic’ for both international trade and
labor economists,  the impact  of  globalization and the international  division of
labor on the employment and wage rate of firms and countries involved is still
ambiguous. 
The  question  if  the  international  relocation  of  production  activities
determines a change in the skill intensity of jobs is still unanswered, especially in
Italy (Piva and Vivarelli, 2004): what seems clear is that such effect depends on
the type of offshoring strategy adopted, the unit of analysis considered and the
empirical methodology employed. 
The literature on the skill composition effects of offshoring can be divided
in  two  main  lines  of  research,  according  to  the  perspective  through  which
offshoring is conceived.  
The  first  bulk  of  studies  looks  at  offshoring  as  a  foreign  investment
strategy  of  the  firm,  and,  in  this  respect,  distinguishes  between  vertical  and
horizontal  FDI  (Markusen  et  al.,  1996;  Lipsey,  2002).  The  former  is  mainly
driven by the will of exploiting the differences in factors endowments and prices
and leads to a net decrease in domestic employment (Agarwal, 1997; Braconier
and Ekholm, 2000; Mariotti, Mutinelli and Piscitello, 2003). The latter, instead, is
driven by the will to replicate in foreign countries the whole production process of
the  home country,  with  the  aim of  getting  access  to  new markets  and  global
opportunities and with the effect of increasing the skill intensity of domestic jobs
and  employment  (Markusen  et  al.,  1996;  Blömstrom,  Fors  and  Lipsey,  1997;
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Mariotti, Mutinelli and Piscitello, 2003). 
However, if the evidence generally agree on the total employment effects
of  FDI,  less  explored  is  the  issue  of  the  effect  of  FDI  on  the  human  capital
composition  of  the  workforce.  In  other  words,  does  investing  in  cheap-labor
countries lead to a skill upgrading at home? 
Head and Ries (2002) try to answer this question by looking at Japanese
multinationals  in  the  period  1965-1990:  their  results  point  to  a  positive
relationship  between  offshoring  and  the  demand  for  skilled  labor  only  if  the
former turns towards developing countries and only when the unit of analysis is
the single firm. Similarly, Hansson (2004) finds that the production delocalization
towards less developed countries contributes to the general increase in the average
level of qualification within Swedish multinationals. For Italy, Barba Navaretti
and Castellani (2004) and Castellani, Mariotti and Piscitello (2006) find a skill
upgrading effect  of foreign investments by multinationals  primarily due to the
international relocation of low value-added segments of the production process
that lead to a lower demand for low-skill labor at home.  
In  contrast  with  these  results,  Slaughter  (2000),  looking  at  32  US
manufacturing industries in the 1980s, does not show clear results in favour of the
positive  relationship  between  FDI  and  the  employment  of  skilled  workers  at
home.
Another  group  of  studies,  instead,  focuses  on  the  trade  dimension  of
offshoring  and  consider  it  as  a  strategy  of  international  fragmentation  of  the
production  process.  According  to  Jones  and  Kierzkowski  (2001),  international
fragmentation can be thought as a process of splitting up and spread of previously
integrated stages of production over an international network of production sites.
More  specifically,  production  offshoring  refers  to  the  de-localization  of
manufacturing activities towards a low-cost country or region4. To the extent that
this practice determines a reorganization of the production process, it  implies a
labor recomposition within domestic firms. 
4 Alternatively, the  Oxford English Dictionary defines offshoring as the action or practice of
moving  or  basing  a  business  operation  abroad,  usually  to  take  advantage  of  lower  costs
(http://dictionary.oed.com/). 
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The evidence available from international trade literature provides general
support  for  the  skill-biased nature  of  production relocation.  Wood (1994),  for
instance, calculates that import competition determines a reduction in the demand
for unskilled labor by 30% in 1990. On the same line are Sachs and Shatz (1994),
who conclude that production internationalization exerts a double effect on overall
labor composition: it is not only the cause of a general decrease in manufacturing
but,  together with technological  change, is a determinant of the decline in the
relative demand for low-skilled workers.  Moreover, Feenstra and Hanson (1996)
give some evidence that, for the period 1972-1990, international outsourcing is
responsible of a 30% to 50% rise in the demand for skilled workers, and, thus, for
a rise in income inequality. 
For the UK, Anderton and Brenton (1999) estimate that, between 1970 and
1986, imports from low-wage countries determine a negative impact of about 40%
on  the  wage-bill  share  and  relative  employment  of  low-skilled  workers.  This
result is further reinforced by Hijzen et al. (2004), who show that, between 1982
and 1996, international outsourcing has a strong negative impact on the demand
for semi-skilled and unskilled labor.
For France, Strauss-Khan (2003), using input-output tables and labor data,
finds that the highly increasing vertical specialization, i.e. the share of imported
inputs in production, is the main determinant of the sharp decline in the share of
unskilled workers between 1977 and 1993, passed from -15% in the period 1977-
85 to -25% between 1985 and 1993. 
For Austria, instead, a positive and significant effect on skills comes out
only for proxies of international trade like export openness and outsourcing, while
a negative effect  arises when considering import penetration (Dell’mour  et al.,
2000). 
For what concerns Italy, the scanty evidence seems to support the positive
relationship between skills and offshoring. Helg and Tajoli (2005) compare the
effect of international fragmentation of production on the skill ratio in Italy and in
Germany and show that a positive and significant impact emerges only for the
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former, while for the latter a negative effect seems to prevail5. 
Concluding,  the  most  recent  literature  on  skill-bias  international
fragmentation  of  production  seems  to  generally  stress  the  negative  impact  of
production offshoring on the employment and pay of unskilled relative to skilled
workers. However, what also emerges is that country specific effects, different
measurement  and  econometric  techniques   matter  in  explaining  these  effects.
Indeed, whether international delocalization is a sufficiently large phenomenon in
order to account for any economically significant skill-bias effects is, therefore, an
empirical matter. 
3. Methodology and data
Empirical  studies  testing  for  the  skill-biased  international  trade  are  generally
based on the estimation of labour demand equations, typically in a transcendental
logarithmic form (Christensen et al., 1973; Berman et al., 1994). 
However  useful,  this  approach  suffers  some  limitations.  First  of  all,  it
relies on a simple cost or production function framework, which is subject to a set
of  ad hoc restrictions in order to assure its tractability: optimization restriction,
homogeneity assumptions  and the specific parametric form that constraints the
parameters  to  assume  specific  values.  Second,  limited  information  is  usually
provided  on  labour  composition  and  firms  characteristics,   these  latter  being
particularly important if one believes that firms endogenously choose to invest
abroad by looking at previous experience and at the composition of its internal
assets.  Thus,  a  possible  problem of  sample  selection  may  arise,  according  to
which the set of firms which decide to transfer production stages abroad cannot be
thought as  randomly drawn from the population. 
Our contribution to the debate is to bypass these issues by employing a
semi-parametric  approach  based  on  PSM  (Rosenbaum  and  Rubin,  1983)
developed  within  the  evaluation  literature  in  a  context  of  observational  data
5 Similar results for the German case emerge also in Fitzenberger (1999) and Falk and Koebel
(2000),  who  find  no  evidence  that  international  outsourcing  of  production  and  services
positively affect the skill composition of manufacturing workforce. Rather, Fitzenberger leaves
technology the dominant role in shifting away the employment of unskilled workers. 
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(Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, 1996; Heckman, 1990, 1997; Heckman, Hichimura
and Todd, 1997; Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999; Sianesi, 2004; Wooldridge
2001; Smith and Todd, 2005). On this purpose, PSM is a more flexible technique
with respect to standard labour demand estimation, because it does not force the
imposition of a parametric specification and it allows to handle the selection bias
along with the problem of (time-invariant)  unobserved heterogeneity when the
outcome variable  is  appropriately constructed by exploiting the  repeated cross
section structure of the data. 
Next to this, PSM is particularly helpful in order to draw some conclusions
on the skill composition effects occurring within offshoring firms, since it allows
the comparison with a suitable counterfactual sample of firms that, in the same
period  and  with  the  same  attributes,  have  not  delocalized  production.  The
association to Psm of a difference-in-differences estimation, in particular, allows
also to control for any possible unobserved selection bias arising when only a
certain type of firm chooses to offshore production (Calinedo and Hujer, 2005;
Smith and Todd, 2005).
Operationally,  the  Difference-In-Differences-Propensity  Score  Matching
(DID-PSM  henceforth)  approach  consists  in  a  two  step  procedure.  For  our
purpose,  we estimate,  at  first,  the probability of being an offshoring firm (the
propensity score) conditional on the vector of firm characteristics X. These latter
are supposed not only to affect the firm’s decision to offshore production, but also
to have an influence on the dependent variable, i.e. the skill composition of the
labor-force. In this respect, we consider a set of controls on firm’s geographical
location, sector6 of economic activity, size, age and the belonging to a group. 
Following  the  empirical  literature  on  the  determinants  of  offshoring
(Abraham and Taylor, 1996; Girma and Görg, 2004; Barba Navaretti, Castellani
and  Disdier,  2006)  we  also  include  variables  capturing  firm’s  previous
delocalization  activity  -  represented  by  a  FDI  dummy  at  time  t-17 -   firm’s
6 We use the Pavitt taxonomy instead of a standard ATECO classification of economic sectors in
order to avoid the possibility of perfect identification of the sample during the estimation. 
7 Since the 1995-97 Survey questionnaire does not include a direct question  on international
delocalization, we use the dummy on FDI as a proxy.
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technology - given by a R&D dummy - labor cost per employee, firm’s average
productivity  and  capital  intensity.  Finally  we  include  a  variable  of  financial
profitability  represented  by  returns  on  investments  (for  a  description  of  the
variables see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
At the second stage, we use the propensity score obtained to estimate the
average treatment effect on the treated (ATT). In our case the outcome variables
are the DID (in levels) of the skill ratios of the workforce and the DID (in levels)
of  each  occupational  categories  (top  managers,  middle  managers,  clerks  and
manual workers, see Table A2 in the Appendix) on total firm employment.  
In the first stage, the estimation of the probabilities is obtained through a
probit regression, which gives as coefficients the estimated probabilities of cross-
border offshoring. The fitted values of the binary model are then used in order to
correctly align the units on their common characteristics and the mean comparison
in the second stage is performed on the counterfactual units so aligned, that is on
the units lying over the common support. 
At this stage, a first issue we need to address is the balancing property of
the propensity score. In order to test for it, we implement the procedure developed
by Becker and Ichino (2002), according to which, if the balancing property is
satisfied, the exposure to treatment can be thought to be random8.
In the second stage of the estimation we apply the DID-PSM, in which we
decide to adopt (i) the nearest neighbour (NN) algorithm (Dehejia and Wahba,
1999), and (ii) a caliper, or radius, estimator (CM) (Cochran and Rubin, 1973).
Since NN matching pairs each treated firm to one counterfactual firm, the closest
neighbour of the treated unit, it likely minimizes the bias at the expenses of the
efficiency.  Usually a trade-off between variance and bias arises when applying
one or the other of the available algorithms for the matching estimation. In our
case,  in  order  to  reduce  the  loss  in  efficiency  that  NN bears  on,  we  use  an
oversampling version of NN  and one with caliper (replacement) of the NN. In so
doing we allow the comparison of each treated unit to more than a single closest
counterfactual unit (Smith and Todd 2005; Caliendo, Hujer and Thomsen 2005). 
8 See  Becker  and   Ichino  (2002)  for  a  detailed  description  of  the  procedure  for  testing  the
balancing property.
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In summary, the main aim of the DID-PSM score matching method is to
generate  a  set  of  non-offshoring  firms  among  all  those  that  do  not  relocate
production and being as more similar as possible to the treated (offshoring) firms
in  order  to  get  a  proxy  of  what  would  have  happened  to  domestic  skill
composition within offshoring firms provided that they had not chosen to displace
activities outside national borders. 
3.4. Data 
We test these predictions on a sample of Italian manufacturing firms drawn from
the last three waves (VII, VIII and IX) of the Survey on Manufacturing Firms
(Indagine sulle Imprese Manifatturiere) conducted by Capitalia (ex Mediocredito
Centrale) and covering the period 1995-2003. For the three surveys, interviews
have been respectively conducted in 1998, 2001 and 2004 over  all  firms with
more than 500 employees and over a representative sample of firms with more
than 11 and less than 500 employees, stratified by geographical area, sector of
economic activity and size. In our analysis we use a repeated cross-section of
firms appearing in all three waves, 1995-97, 1998-2000 and 2001-03. Each of the
three  waves  gather  information  on  4.497,  4.680  and  4.289  units  respectively,
while the number of observations we obtain from merging the three cross-sections
is 414. 
As it can be noted in the Table 1, the major part of the observations in our
restricted  sample  is  constituted  by  small  and  medium  small  firms  (74,5%).
Supplier dominated and specialized suppliers firms represent the only sectors out
of  four  having  experienced  production  offshoring9,  so  that  firms  belonging  to
scale intensive and science-based sectors have been dropped in order to avoid the
generation of bad matches10. After this additional cleaning, the number of units
decreases to 330.
9 This is in line, for instance, with Capitalia (2001) and Fortis (2005), who find that the most
involved sectors in offshoring practices are textile and clothing, leather and shoes and machinery. 
10 We replicate the same estimations for the whole matched sample of 414 firms without reaching
significantly different outcomes. In the paper we only show the results concerning the restricted
sample; full-matched sample estimations are available on request. 
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Table 1. Sample structure by economic sector and employment size
Size Supplier Dominated Specialized Suppliers Total
11-20 30 11 41
21-50 68 52 120
51-250 72 54  126
251-500 15 10 25
501+ 9 9 18
Total 194 136 330
Source: authors' elaborations from the Survey of Manufacturing Firms, 1995-2003.
Table 2 shows that only 16 (about 5%) of the 330 firms have chosen to
offshore  production.  Such  a  figure,  however,  overestimates  the  percentage  of
offshoring firms in the complete Capitalia sample coming from the VIII wave of
the Survey on Manufacturing Firms,  which is  equal  to  the  1.9% of the  entire
sample (Capitalia,  2001).  Another  important  aspects  that  should be stressed is
that, differently from to the original 1998-2000 cross-section – in which the share
of offshoring firms progresses along with their employment size -  in our merged
sample small and medium firms show a higher propensity to delocalize than large
firms.  Even if this can represent a bias of representativeness, it should be noted
that our cleaning procedure allows to replicate a quasi-experiment in which we
‘isolate’ only firms that are present in each wave of the Survey, located in the
most active environments (sectors) with respect to the ‘treatment’ of interest and
maintaining the general employment size distribution with respect to the original
cross-sections.  
Table 2. Production offshoring by Pavitt sector and employment size
Offshoring Num. Obs. Frequency
No 314 95.15
Yes 16 4.85
Total 330 100.00
Offshoring Supplier Dominated Specialized Suppliers Total
No 185 129 314
Yes 9 7 16
Total 194 136 330
Offshoring 11-20 21-50 51-250 251-500 501+ Total
No 39 114 122 22 17 314
Yes 2 6 4 3 1 16
Total 41 120 126 25 18 330
Source:  authors' elaborations from the Survey of Manufacturing Firms, 1995-2003.
11
4. Estimation and results
Some first interesting observations can be drawn by looking at the trend of the
variables used to construct the outcomes of the DID-PSM in the time span 1995-
2003.  Figures  A1-A2  in  the  Appendix  show  the  trends  of  the  employment
composition by skill  ratios and occupational  categories  for  firms lying on the
common support. As far as the skill ratios are concerned, the ratio between non-
manual  (managers,  middle-managers  and  clerks)  and  manual  workers  (blue-
collars)  does  not  show any relevant  difference  over  the  time  span  considered
(1995-2003) because both components seem to follow a very similar trend.
When we disaggregate the skill ratio by its occupational components, the
evidence about the trends becomes more heterogeneous.  When we look at  the
ratio between the total management (top and middle) and blue collars (manuals),
we note an upskilling trend for treated units in front of a quite stable path for
untreated ones, thus leading to positive skill differentials between 2001-03 and
1998-2000 as well as 1998-2000 and 1995-97, but probably a small differential
between the first and the last triennium. When we focus on middle management
over  blue  collars,  instead,  a  negative  differential  emerges  due  to  the  quite
oscillatory trend of the skill ratios for offshoring firms in front of a quite stable,
even increasing, trend for non-offshoring firms. When we finally include clerks at
the  denominator,  the  figures  show  a  general  higher  profile  in  the  relative
employment of skilled workers  for treated units11. 
In order to have a clear picture, we also look at the trend of each single
occupational category. While clerks and manuals do not show relevant difference
in the trends between treated and untreated firms,  the employment  of top and
middle-managers seems to show quite abrupt shifts. 
Before proceeding with the comments of the main results of DID-PSM it is
convenient to spend some words on the determination of the propensity score and
the presence of firms on common support. 
As stated above, the procedure adopted to test for the balancing property
11 To this results contributes quite heavily the number of firms in the two groups on the common
support: 16 at maximum for delocalizing firms; 104 for non delocalizing firms. 
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of the propensity score is the one developed by Becker and Ichino (2002). After
having  estimated  the  probability  of  offshoring  production  stages,  we  (Tables
A3.1-A3.3): “split the sample in k equally spaced intervals of the propensity score
[…]; within each interval test that the average propensity score of treated and
control units do not differ; if the test fails in one interval, split the interval in
halves and test again [and] continue until, in all intervals, the average propensity
score of treated and control units do not differ; within each interval, test that the
means of  each characteristic  do not  differ  between treated and control  units”
Becker and Ichino (2002, p. 3). In our case, the balancing property  is satisfied12.
As far as the distribution of the firms on the common support is concerned,
Figure  A3  and  Table  A3.3  show that  two offshoring  firms  do  not  lie  on  the
overlapping support.  This  means  that,  in  the  matching estimation,  two treated
units do not have appropriate counterfactual units and they cannot be considered
for the comparison procedure. 
Tables 3 to 5 present the main results achieved from the propensity score
matching estimation. The outcome from the first stage is, instead, listed in the
Appendix (Tables A3.1, A3.2 and A3.3). 
In order to account for the heterogeneous composition of the labor force,
we define different skill variables and we estimate the impact of our ‘treatment’,
i.e. offshoring, on their variation over time. We first start with the most aggregate
indicator, that is the ratio between non-manual and manual workers, the former
including high skilled occupations such as top and middle managers and clerks,
while the latter comprising low-skilled occupations as production workers (blue-
collars). 
Both NN propensity score with oversampling and NN with caliper, which
works  in  the  same  direction  as  allowing  for  replacement  in  terms  of  trading
between bias and variance,  show that the effect of production offshoring on the
ATT is always negative but not significantly different from zero. This means that
firms  choosing  to  externalize  production  do  not  seem  to  face  any  particular
aggregate skill re-composition dynamics over the sample period.   
12 The output of the Becker and Ichino (2002) module is not fully reported but it is available upon
request. 
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In  order  to  shed  more  light  on this  result,  we  further  disaggregate  the
previous variable in order to analyse the dynamics of each single skill category for
the treated and the untreated observations. On this purpose, we identify other four
skill variables, whose difference-in-differences constructions are reported in Table
A.2:  top  and  middle  managers  over  blue-collars;  middle  managers  over  blue-
collars; top and middle managers over clerks plus blue-collars; middle-managers
over clerks plus blue-collars.
 Table 3 shows again the results for the first two of these variables. In
particular,  when  looking  at  the  effect  of  production  offshoring  on
DID_TM+MM/Man we  still  note  a  negative  but  not  significant  outcome.  The
outcome changes when we look at the second skill variable, i.e. DID_MM/Man, in
which, at the numerator, we identify the probably most skilled component of the
workforce.  When  we  allow the  propensity  score  to  use  the  same  non-treated
observations more than once and we increase the maximal allowed difference in
the propensity score of treated and matched control units, or when we pass to a
CM estimation, we find a negative – even if of a modest entity -  and statistically
significant  result.  This  means  that  offshoring  firms  face  a  decrease  in  the
employment of skilled personnel, relative to the unskilled.
Very similar results seem to emerge from Table 4, when we simply add
clerks at the denominator of both skill ratios. Again, offshoring does not seem to
particularly affect the difference over time of (DID_TM+MM/C+Man), i.e. skilled
non-manual  over  unskilled,  both  manual  and  non-manual).  A  significant  and
negative effect, even if of small magnitude, emerges when looking at the ratio
between  (skilled)  middle  managers  and  (unskilled)  blue  collars  plus  clerks.
Manufacturing firms exposed to the offshoring treatment are more likely to suffer
a deskilling re-composition of their workforce over time. 
We  finally  consider  the  dynamics  of  each  single  skill-occupational
category. In this case we observe the difference in the relative employment of top
managers, middle manages, clerks and blue-collars for the treated and the control
units.  In  line  with  previous  results,  Table  4  and  Table  5  show that  the  most
significant  effect  –  even if  small  -  of  production relocation is  on the  relative
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employment of middle-managers, still with a negative sign. 
We  can  interpret  these  results  in  different  ways.  On  the  one  hand,
differently from previous empirical literature on Italy, the defensive nature of the
offshoring strategy may be a vehicle of a 'substitution effect' that sometimes can
be detrimental for the most skilled component of the workforce. In other words,
the fact of de-locating production activities to cheap-labor countries may reduce
the overall scale of the  domestic activity, thus reducing more significantly, or
more intensively, the demand for those skills  - like coordination, control, design
and so on – in which middle-managers are specialized, with respect to a decrease
in the demand for manual skills, at least in the short run. 
A  second,  possible  explanation,  concerns  the  fact  that  the  cost-driven
strategy of production relocation may hide a strategy of new markets seeking, or
of replication of the domestic production and business model13, then involving the
more or less temporary transfer of managerial staff to the host country. This result
can be in line with some recent evidence, according to which Italian firms that
offshore production activities to cheap-labor countries are like to move part of
their  managerial  skills  because  of  the  need  to  coordinate  and  manage  new,
external units of production directly  in the place of destination where such skills
lack (Mariotti and Mutinelli, 2005; Spaventa and Monni, 2007).   
 However, the picture emerging from this exercise should be taken with
caution.  Our  data,  in  fact,  suffer  some  limitations:  first  of  all,  the  number  of
offshoring  firms  is  quite  low,  so  that  the  analysis  should  be  compared  to  an
experiment  and our results  should be thought  as  the expression of  'symptoms'
more than of real 'pathologies'. Second, we restricted our sample to traditional and
specialized  suppliers  sectors,  with  the  consequence  of  loosing  some
representativeness  of  the  firms'  entire  population  and   reducing  the  field  of
application of our results. Finally, we consider a relatively short period of time,
i.e.  three  years  after  the  treatment,  in  which,  probably,  the  real  labor  market
effects of production offshoring are not fully emerged and consolidated. 
13 We can think, for instance, at small and medium firms located in Veneto that have somehow
replicated the industrial district model in countries like Slovakia and Romania.
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Table 3.  The skill composition effects of production offshoring in Italy, 1995-2003
 Outcome Variables 
 DID_NMan/Man DID_TM+MM/Man DID_MM/Man
Algorithm Effect st. err.
Firms out of
the common
support 
Effect st. err.
Firms out
of the
common
support 
Effect st. err.
Firms out of
the common
support 
Nearest
neighbour with
oversampling
2 0.064 0.167 2 -0.023 0.041 2 -0.0 0.017 2
5 -0.066 0.153 2 -0.027 0.037 2 -0.020 0.020 2
10 -0.019 0.110 2 -0.015 0.033 2 -0.027 0.020 2
Nearest
neighbour with
replacement
caliper 0.01 -0.020 0.184 2 -0.069*** 0.034 2 -0.043 0.017 2
caliper 0.02 -0.005 0.194 2 -0.057** 0.070 2 -0.040*** 0.019 2
caliper 0.05 0.033 0.197 2 -0.022 0.043 2 -0.038** 0.021 2
Note: the standard errors are computed by bootstrapping using 50 replications.
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Table 4. The skill composition effects of production offshoring in Italy, 1995-2003
Outcome Variables
DID_ TM+MM/C+Man DID_MM/C+Man TM/Employment
Algorithm Effect st. err.
Firms out of
the common
support 
Effect st. err.
Number of
delocalizing
firms off
common
support
Effect st. err.
Firms out of
the common
support 
Nearest
neighbour with
oversampling
2 -0.018 0.034 2 -0.024* 0.013 2 0.009 0.020 2
5 -0.016 0.030 2 -0.028** 0.013 2 0.013 0.020 2
10 -0.009 0.030 2 -0.025* 0.013 2 0.017 0.017 2
Nearest
neighbour with
replacement
cal 0.01 -0.006 0.029 2 -0.04*** 0.012 2 -0.014 0.017 2
cal 0.02 -0.045* 0.026 2 -0.032** 0.014 2 -0.007 0.016 2
cal 0.05 -0.016 0.032 2 -0.030** 0.015 2 -0.015 0.022 2
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Table 5. The skill composition effects of production offshoring in Italy, 1995-2003
Outcome Variables
MM/E Clerks/E Manuals/E
Algorithm Effect st. err.
Firms out of
the common
support 
Effect st. err.
Number of
delocalizing
firms off
common
support
Effect st. err.
Firms out
of the
common
support 
Nearest
neighbour
with
oversampling
2 -0.018* 0.010 2 0.022 0.058 2 0.029 0.086 2
5 -0.023** 0.010 2 0.003 0.040 2 0.013 0.051 2
10 -0.019** 0.010 2 -0.008 0.031 2 0.004 0.036 2
Nearest
neighbour
with
replacement
cal 0.01 -0.026** 0.013 2 0.016 0.058 2 -0.052 0.102 2
cal 0.02 -0.025** 0.010 2 0.019 0.055 2 -0.052 0.090 2
cal 0.05 -0.023** 0.010 2 0.017 0.063 2 -0.064 0.101 2
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5. Conclusions
In this work we look at the existence of a skill composition effect of production
offshoring  on  the  Italian  manufacturing  workforce.  In  order  to  control  for
selection bias and unobserved heterogeneity we use a  difference-in-differences
propensity score estimator, that, although grounded on identification assumptions,
is not based on a parametric specification of the relations of interests and does not
rely on optimization restrictions. 
The results achieved give the impression that the offshoring strategy of the
Italian  manufacturing  firms  does  not  exert  an  evident  impact  on  the  skill
composition of the workforce. In line with previous results (Piva and Vivarelli,
2004),  the  strategy  of  production offshoring seems to  have  an  overall  modest
effect on domestic occupational categories and on the skill intensity of jobs. 
Where a significant effect emerges, however, middle-managers seem to be
the most affected category, as expressed by the negative trend of their relative
employment ratio. 
This piece of evidence may find a twofold explanation. On the one hand,
the trasfer of production stages may also involve the loss of those complementary,
and  more  knowlege-intensive,  activities  –  like  control,  supervision,  design,
coordination – for which high-skilled personnel are required. On the other hand,
the initially defensive nature of delocalization can also hide a strategy of new
markets seeking or horizontal replication of domestic activities, thus claiming for
the transfer of managerial staff, like engineers, designers, production and project
managers,  to host countries in which they lack.  
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Appendix
Table A1-Variable definitions and summary statistics
VARIABLE DEFINITION MEAN STD.DEV. MIN MAX
Dependent variable of the first stage probit regression
d_deloc00 Dummy delocalization .048 .215 0 1
Control variables
Lnage Natural  logarithm (2003-year  of
firm’s set-up) 3.402 .572 1.945 7.602
nw Liguria,  Lombardia,  Piemonte,
Valle d’Aosta .457 .498 0 1
ne Emilia-Romagna, Friuli Venezia-
Giulia,  Trentino  Alto-Adige,
Veneto
.300 .458 0 1
cen Abruzzo, Lazio, Marche, Molise,
Toscana, Umbria .160 .367 0 1
south Basilicata,  Calabria,  Campania,
Puglia, Sardegna, Sicilia .081 .274 0 1
suppldom Textiles,  footwear,  food  and
beverage,  paper  and  printing,
wood
.587 .492 0 1
specsupp Machinery and equipment, office
accounting  and  computer
machinery,  medical  optical  and
precision instruments
.412 .492 0 1
lsize Nat.  log  average  employment
size 1998-2000 4.147 1.097 2.335 8.542
group9507 = 1 if the firm belongs to a group
at 31.12.1997; =0 otherwise .227 .419 0 1
group9800 = 1 if the firm belongs to a group
at 31.12.2000; =0 otherwise .257 .437 0 1
Export and FDI
d_fdi97 =1 if the firm has effected FDIs
in R&D in 1995-97; =0 otherwise .239 .427 0 1
Technology
d_res97 =1  if  the  firm  has  invested  in
R&D in 1995-97; =0 otherwise 1.581 .494 0 1
d_res00 =1  if  the  firm  has  invested  in
R&D in 1998-2000; =0 otherwise .496 .500 0 1
Unit labor costs
lcla9597 Nat.  log.  labor  costs  per
employee 1995-97 3.453 .620 1.873 5.617
lcla9800 Nat.  log.  labor  costs  per
employee 1998-2000 3.297 .259 2.256 4.230
Productivity
lfatta9597 Nat.  log.  sales  per  employee
1995-97 5.245 .760 3.536 7.395
lfatta9800 Nat.  log  sales  per  employee
1998-2000 3.444 .386 2.753 4.774
Capital intensity
litna9597 Nat.  log.  net  capital  assets  per
employee 1995-97 3.411 1.009 -.366 5.826
litna9800 Nat.  log.  net  capital  assets  per
employee 1998-2000 3.315 .875 -.274 5.443
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Profitability
roi9597 Log  Returns  on  investments
1995-1997 2.824 0.895 -1.111 5.775
    
Table A2. Outcome variables
Outcome variables construction
DIDNonManuals/Manua
ls 
(DID_NMan/Man)
[(NonManuals/Manuals)03-(NonManuals/Manuals)00]-
[(NonManuals/Manuals)98-(NonManuals/Manuals)95]
DIDTopMng+MidMng/
Manuals 
(DID_TM+MM/Man)
[(Managers+MidMans/Manual)03-( Managers+MidMans/ Manuals)
00] – [(Managers+MidMans/Manuals)98  -                  
( Managers+MidMans/Manuals)95]
DIDMidMng/Manuals 
(DID_MM/Man)
[(MidMans/Manuals)03-( MidMans/Manuals)00]-
[(MidMans/Manuals)98-( MidMans/Manuals)95]
DIDTopMng+MidMng/
Clerks+Manuals 
(DID_
TM+MM/C+Man)
[(Managers+MidMans/ Clerks+Manuals)03-
( Managers+MidMans/ Clerks+Manuals) 00] -
[(Managers+MidMans/ Clerks+Manuals)98  -
(Managers+MidMans/ Clerks+Manuals)95]
DIDMidMng/Clerks+M
anuals
(DID_MM/C+Man)
[(MidMans/Clerks+Manuals)03-
( MidMans/Clerks+Manuals)00]- [(MidMans/Clerks+Manuals)98-
( MidMans/Clerks+Manuals)95]
DIDTopMng/TotalEmp
(DID_ TM/E)
[(Managers/TotalEmployees)03-
( Managers/TotalEmployees) 00] - [(Managers/TotalEmployees)98  -
(Managers/TotalEmployees)95]
DIDMidMng/TotalEmp
(DID_ MM/E)
[(MidMans/TotalEmployees)03-
( MidMans/TotalEmployees) 00] -[(MidMans/TotalEmployees)98  -
(MidMans/TotalEmployees)95]
DIDClerks/TotalEmp
(DID_ Clerks/E)
[(Clerks/TotalEmployees)03- (Clerks/TotalEmployees) 00] -
[(Clerks/TotalEmployees)98-(Clerks/TotalEmployees)95]          
DIDManuals/TotalEmp
(DID_ Man/E)
[(Manuals/TotalEmployees)03- (Manuals/TotalEmployees) 00] -
[(Manuals/TotalEmployees)98-(Manuals/TotalEmployees)95]          
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Table A3.1. First-stage probit regression
Dependent variable:
d_deloc00 Coef. S.E. z
lnage 0.565** 0.264 2.14
nw -0.659 0.482 -1.37
ne 0.223 0.415 0.54
south 0.129 0.652 0.20
lsize 0.157 0.178 0.88
specsupp 0.623* 0.356 1.75
group97 -0.257 0.463 -0.56
group00 0.655 0.451 1.45
d_res9597 -0.224 0.315 -0.71
d_res00 -0.455 0.356 -1.28
d_fdi9597ue -0.358 0.375 -0.96
roi9597 0.003 0.004 0.72
roi9800 -2.012 3.133 -0.64
litna9597 -0.351 0.317 -1.11
litna9800 0.218 0.280 0.78
lfatta9597 -1.469** 0.755 -1.95
lfatta9800 1.934** 0.761 2.54
lcla9597 1.874** 0.790 2.37
lcla9800 -2.231** 0.935 -2.39
constant -5.108** 2.483 -2.06
Log likelihood -49.906
Number of obs 326
LR chi2(21) 27.85
Prob > chi2 0.086  
Table A3.2. Description of the propensity score in the common support region
 Percentiles Smallest   
1% 0.030 0.029  
5% 0.031 0.030  
10% 0.033 0.030 Obs 140
25% 0.045 0.030 Sum of Wgt. 140
  
50% 0.074 Mean 0.104
 Largest Std. Dev. 0.097
75% 0.114 0.378  
90% 0.214 0.401 Variance 0.009
95% 0.304 0.406 Skewness 3.181
99% 0.406 0.757 Kurtosis 17.918
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Table A3.3. Inferior bound, number of treated and number of controls in each block
Inferior  of  block  of
pscore dummy offshoring  
1998-2000  
0 1 total
  
0.0292903 112 10 100
0.2 10 5 15
0.4 2 0 2
0.6 0 1 1
  
Total 124 16 140
The final number of blocks is 4:
this number of blocks ensures that the mean propensity score is not different for treated
and controls in each blocks
Notes: the output  is  the one reported in the STATA module developed by Becker and Ichino
(2002).
29
Figure A1 – Trends in the skill ratio for treated and untreated firms on the  common support
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Figure A2 – Occupational categories trends in delocalizing and non-delocalizing firms
common support
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